Monsanto Company v. Geertson Seed Farms

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Argued April 27, 2010. Decided June 21, 2010.

Authorship: Josh Patashnik of Stanford Law School (with Howe & Russell's Amy Howe contributing to the opinion recap)

Docket: 09-475

Issues: (1) Whether plaintiffs under the National Environmental Policy Act are specially exempt from the requirement of showing a likelihood of irreparable harm to obtain an injunction; (2) whether a district court may enter an injunction sought to remedy a NEPA violation without conducting an evidentiary hearing sought by a party to resolve genuinely disputed facts directly relevant to the appropriate scope of the requested injunction; and (3) whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it affirmed a nationwide injunction that sought to remedy a NEPA violation based on only a remote possibility of reparable harm.

1 Briefs and Documents
2 Opinion Recaps
3 Pre-Argument Articles
- 3.1 Argument Preview
4 Links and Further Information
- 4.1 Media Links
- 4.2 From the Blogosphere

[edit] Briefs and Documents

[edit] Decision

REVERSED AND REMANDED in a 7-1 decision with an opinion written by Justice Alito. Justice Stevens dissented, and Justice Breyer took no part.

[edit] Oral Argument

Transcript (April 27, 2010)

[edit] Merits Briefs

[edit] Amicus Briefs

[edit] Certiorari-Stage Briefs

[edit] Opinion Recaps

Laurie Williams originally wrote the following for SCOTUSblog:

In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms (No. 09-475), the Court held that the district court abused its discretion when it enjoined a federal agency from deregulating a plant pending the completion of an environmental review. Justice Alito wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Justice Stevens dissented, while Justice Breyer did not participate in the case.

Under the Plant Protection Act, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has authority to prevent “the introduction of plant pests into the United States.” The USDA has delegated rulemaking power under this provision to one of its divisions, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). APHIS’s regulations presume that genetically modified plants are “pests” unless it determines otherwise – a decision that must be made in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which requires an environmental impact statement (EIS) unless an interim environmental assessment (EA) finds that the deregulation will not have a significant impact on the environment.

Petitioner Monsanto Company asked APHIS to deregulate Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a genetically modified alfalfa crop. After preparing an EA, APHIS granted Monsanto’s petition, finding that deregulation would not have a significant impact on the environment. The respondents in this case – conventional alfalfa farms and environmental groups – filed this suit. The district court agreed with the respondents that APHIS’s actions had violated NEPA, and it subsequently (1) vacated APHIS’s deregulation decision; (2) ordered the agency to prepare an EIS before it ruled on Monsanto’s deregulation petition; and (3) enjoined virtually all planting of RRA until the agency could finish the EIS. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

In its opinion reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Court began by holding that both parties had standing to pursue their claims. Petitioners were injured because they could not sell RRA until APHIS completed the EIS, and their injury could be redressed by a favorable ruling, thus satisfying constitutional standing requirements. Respondents also had standing, because the substantial risk of gene flow injured them by increasing their costs and requiring them to take steps to minimize risks of contamination.

After also making clear that the traditional four-factor test applied in cases involving NEPA violations, the Court then turned to the central question: whether the district court had abused its discretion when it both enjoined APHIS from partially deregulating RRA pending the completion of the EIS and prohibited most planting of RRA. The Court held that it had.

First, the Court explained that the district court’s injunction improperly prohibited any partial deregulation. Once the District Court determined that APHIS’s original complete deregulation of RRA was procedurally invalid, it was then for APHIS to decide whether it would partially deregulate RRA; if it opted to do so, that decision could be challenged in a separate action. Thus, although the district court could decline to adopt the judgment proposed by APHIS – which would have authorized a partial deregulation – it lacked authority to enjoin a partial deregulation that had not yet occurred. “Until APHIS actually seeks to effect a partial deregulation,” the Court explained, “any judicial review of such a decision is premature.”

Second, the Court continued, injunctive relief was inappropriate because respondents could not show that they would suffer irreparable injury if APHIS proceeded with a partial deregulation. First, they could always file a new suit challenging such an action. Second, respondents might not suffer any injury at all if the partial deregulation were sufficiently limited in scope; for example, APHIS could deregulate in a way that would eliminate all risk of gene flow to respondents’ crops.

Third and finally, the Court held that the district court erred in entering a nationwide injunction against the planting of RRA. The Court again emphasized the impropriety of enjoining APHIS from partially deregulating RRA: “If APHIS may partially deregulate RRA before preparing a full-blown EIS—a question that we need not and do not decide here—farmers should be able to grow and sell RRA in accordance with that determination.” And because a “less drastic” remedy, such as simply vacating APHIS’s deregulation decision, could redress respondents’ injury, it was unnecessary to resort to the “additional and extraordinary relief of an injunction.”

The lone dissenter, Justice Stevens, first disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of the district court’s judgment, which in his view could be read as rejecting only the particular partial deregulation order proposed by APHIS. But in any event, he still would have affirmed the decision below. First, because the district court found that planting in controlled situations could cause contamination and that APHIS lacked the resources to monitor plantings, it may reasonably have concluded that any deregulation of RRA required an EIS. Second, the district court “could reasonably have feared that partial deregulation would undermine the agency’s eventual decision.” Finally, given the district court’s findings of a substantial risk of gene flow and of APHIS’s weak monitoring capacity, it was reasonable to wait for an EIS.

Amy Howe originally wrote the following for SCOTUSblog:

On June 21 the Court issued its decision in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms (No. 09-475). We will have a more detailed recap of the opinion soon, but we thought it would be useful in the interim to provide a brief summary of the decision (and an introduction to the myriad acronyms in the case). At issue in the case was what injunctive relief a district court may order to remedy a procedural violation of a federal environmental statute – here, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Here the district court had held that the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) violated the NEPA when it deregulated Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA) without conducting an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). As a remedy, the district court enjoined APHIS from partially deregulating RRA, and it prohibited virtually all planting of RRA pending a new EIS.

The Court granted certiorari, and today it reversed. It began by rejecting both sides’ arguments that the other lacked standing. Turning to the merits of the case, it held that the district court abused its discretion in entering the injunctions. With regard to the partial deregulation of RRA, it explained that none of the four criteria for a permanent injunction had been met; moreover, with regard to the nationwide injunction against the planting of RRA, a less drastic remedy was available.

Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter in the case; Justice Breyer did not participate in the case.

[edit] Pre-Argument Articles

[edit] Argument Preview

Josh Patashnik originally wrote the following for SCOTUSblog:

In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms (No. 09-475), the Court will once again consider what injunctive relief a district court may order when it finds a procedural violation of a federal environmental statute. Specifically, the case presents the question of what showing is required in a suit under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to satisfy the “likelihood of irreparable harm” prong of the Court’s four-part test – articulated most recently in Winter v. NRDC (2008) – for the issuance of a permanent injunction.

The case arises from the struggle over the regulatory status of Roundup Ready alfalfa (RRA), a crop genetically engineered by petitioner Monsanto Co. to tolerate glyphosate, the active ingredient in the herbicide Roundup. The Plant Protection Act of 2000 (PPA) directs the Secretary of Agriculture (or his designee—in this case, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)) to promulgate regulations to prevent the “introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United States.” Pursuant to that authority, APHIS has issued regulations governing the introduction of genetically modified organisms that are believed to be plant pests. If an organism is identified as such, a company or individual may petition APHIS for a determination that the organism does not present a plant pest risk and is thus not subject to the regulations.

In 2004, Monsanto filed a petition with APHIS, seeking a determination under the PPA that RRA was not subject to the regulations. A decision by APHIS to approve the petition would trigger NEPA’s procedural requirements. In 2005, as required by NEPA, APHIS prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the petition. In the EA, APHIS made a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), which allowed it to move forward without completing the full-fledged environmental impact statement (EIS) required by NEPA for all major federal actions significantly affecting the environment. APHIS then granted Monsanto’s petition without conducting an EIS.

In February 2006, respondents Geertson Seed Farms (and others, including a bevy of environmental groups) filed suit against the Secretary of Agriculture and other federal officials. They alleged, among other things, that APHIS had violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS for Monsanto’s petition. The district court agreed, finding that the agency’s EA was inadequate. The court then granted Monsanto’s motion to intervene and turned to the question of an appropriate remedy for the NEPA violation. APHIS proposed to cure the violation by imposing restrictions on the planting and handling of RRA until an EIS could be completed. However, the district court rejected this suggestion and instead ordered a permanent nationwide injunction against the planting of RRA.

APHIS and Monsanto appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the permanent injunction was overly broad. The Ninth Circuit disagreed: it held that Geertson had met the traditional four-part test for the issuance of a permanent injunction – including, most notably, the prong requiring the plaintiff to show a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

Monsanto filed a petition for certiorari in which it not only asserted a split between the Ninth and Second Circuits but also framed the case as a logical successor to the Court’s decision in Winter – that is, another case in which the Ninth Circuit had adopted an unduly lax standard for injunctions. Indeed, Monsanto suggested, the Ninth Circuit was effectively attempting an end run around Winter in the NEPA setting by “effectively permit[ting] district courts once again to presume irreparable harm in NEPA cases” without requiring any significant individualized showing of such harm. Such an approach, it argued, would “make broad injunctive relief all but automatic” in NEPA cases, a result incompatible with clear Court precedent (including Winter, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006), and Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell (1987)) that disavowed any presumptive entitlement to injunctive relief. The Court granted cert. on January 15.

In its opening brief on the merits, Monsanto echoes the arguments made in its cert. petition. First, it contends that the Ninth Circuit erred in establishing a presumption of irreparable harm whenever NEPA’s procedural mandates are violated. It analogizes the case at hand to cases involving other environmental statutes (including the Clean Water Act and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act) in which the Court declined to create such a presumption. Although, as Monsanto concedes, the Ninth Circuit expressly denied that it was establishing a presumption of irreparable harm, Monsanto argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach effectively “amounts to the same thing.” Particularly given the broad sweep of the injunctive relief ordered, which substantially exceeded what the Department of Agriculture had proposed in response to the district court’s finding of a NEPA violation, the scope of the injunction goes well beyond what is needed to cure the procedural defect. And in any event, Monsanto concludes, the district court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing on the likelihood of irreparable harm.

In its brief on the merits in support of Monsanto, the federal government similarly argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in establishing a presumption of irreparable harm in NEPA cases. It parts company from Monsanto, however, on the question of the evidentiary hearing: although it contends that the Court does not need to reach the question whether an evidentiary hearing is always required before a finding of likelihood of irreparable harm is made because the injunction is overly broad, it argues in the alternative that district courts should have discretion to decide what kind of additional evidence is appropriate before deciding whether to award permanent injunctive relief in an Administrative Procedure Act case.

Geertson makes three primary arguments in response. It first argues that Monsanto lacks standing to challenge the injunction because any harm that the company has suffered stems from the district court’s order (not challenged on appeal) vacating APHIS’s deregulation decision, rather than from the injunction itself. Thus, Geertson contends, the distribution of RRA would be illegal even in the absence of an injunction. Second, although neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit in fact established a presumption of irreparable harm, Geertson has in any event satisfied the likelihood-of-irreparable-harm prong. Third and finally, the Court should not require district courts to hold a formal trial-type hearing on the likelihood-of-success question, as district courts traditionally retain substantial leeway in determining how to conduct injunction hearings.

[edit] Links and Further Information

[edit] Media Links

[edit] From the Blogosphere

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