United States v. Comstock

From ScotusWiki

Argued January 12, 2010.

Authorship: Anna Christensen of Howe & Russell

Docket: 08-1224

Issue: Whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact 18 U.S.C. 4248, which authorizes court-ordered civil commitment by the federal government of (1) “sexually dangerous” persons who are already in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, but who are coming to the end of their federal prison sentences, and (2) “sexually dangerous” persons who are in the custody of the Attorney General because they have been found mentally incompetent to stand trial.

1 Briefs and Documents
2 Opinion Recap
3 Pre-Argument Articles
- 3.1 Argument Preview
4 Links and Further Information
- 4.1 Media Coverage
- 4.2 From the Blogosphere

Briefs and Documents

Decision

REVERSED AND REMANDED in a 7-2 decision with an opinion written by Justice Breyer. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment only, joined by Justice Alito.

Oral Argument

Transcript (January 12, 2010)

Merits Briefs

Amicus Briefs

Certiorari-Stage Documents

Opinion Recap

Eric Hansford originally wrote the following for SCOTUSblog:

On May 17, the Court issued its decision in United States v. Comstock. At issue in the case was whether Congress exceeded its power when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 4248, which authorizes federal district courts to order the civil commitment of sexually dangerous federal prisoners even after they have served their criminal sentences. By a vote of seven to two, the Court – in an opinion by Justice Breyer – held that Congress had the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass Section 4248. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined Justice Breyer’s opinion, while Justices Kennedy and Alito filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion that Justice Scalia joined in part.

Section 4248 allows individuals in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be civilly committed after they would otherwise be released if: 1) they have engaged (or attempted to engage) in sexually violent conduct or child molestation, 2) they suffer from a serious mental illness, and 3) they would have “serious difficulty” refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. If, after a hearing, a federal district court finds by clear and convincing evidence that all of these criteria are satisfied, the individual is committed to the custody of the Attorney General, who must make “all reasonable efforts” to get the state in which the individual was tried, or, alternatively, the state in which he is now domiciled, to take him. But if the Attorney General is unsuccessful, the individual is then committed to a treatment facility, where he will remain until he no longer represents a danger to others or a state assumes responsibility for the treatment.

The respondents in this case are federal prisoners who were about to be released when the government instituted civil commitment proceedings against them under Section 4248. When the respondents challenged (among other things) the constitutionality of the government’s actions, the district court held (again, among other things) that the statute exceeded Congress’s powers under Article I of the Constitution, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on this ground.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and yesterday it reversed. In the majority’s view, “five considerations, taken together,” compel the conclusion that Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority sufficient to enact Section 4248. First, the Court emphasized, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress “broad authority,” requiring only that a statute “constitute[] a means that is rationally related” to the implementation of an enumerated power. This can build on itself: Congress has broad powers to create federal crimes to further various enumerated powers. Congress can then ensure enforcement of these crimes by imprisoning offenders in federal prisons. In turn, it can take action to guarantee the safety of those who may be affected by federal imprisonment, including those in surrounding communities.

Second, Congress has long enacted prison-related mental health statutes. Section 4248 parallels the older Section 4246, which authorizes the postdetention civil commitment of federal prisoners who are deemed mentally ill and dangerous. Third, because the federal government is a custodian of its prisoners, the Government has “sound reasons” (and perhaps a duty) to protect the public from the dangers created by an individual’s release from federal custody. Fourth, Section 4248 properly accommodates state interests: because the Attorney General is required to encourage states to take custody of the individual, the statute does not invade or limit state sovereignty – an argument supported by twenty-nine states, who filed an amicus brief urging the Court to uphold the statute. Nor does the statute violate the Tenth Amendment because authority that falls under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not “reserved to the States.” Fifth and finally, Section 4248 is narrow, applying only to a small fraction of prisoners. And the connection between Section 4248 and an enumerated power is not too attenuated; as numerous past cases show, Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause authority reaches beyond powers one step removed from an enumerated power. The majority also emphasized that it was not deciding claims of other constitutional defects, including a Due Process Clause violation that the District Court identified, which could potentially be raised again on remand.

Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. In a separate opinion, he emphasized that the Necessary and Proper Clause has limits, and he sought to distance himself from what he regarded as some of the Court’s broadest language. In particular, he underscored that the “rational relationship” test at issue here is much more demanding than the “rational basis” test used in due process cases.

Justice Alito also concurred in the judgment. In his view, there is a “substantial link” between Section 4248 and Congress’s enumerated powers, thereby rendering the statute a necessary and proper means of implementing federal criminal law statutes authorized by Congress’s other enumerated powers.

On the other hand, Justice Thomas’s dissent asserted that Section 4248 cannot satisfy the Necessary and Proper Clause because it does not execute any enumerated power. Thomas also criticized the majority’s “novel” five-factor test: not only is the test unsupported by either the text of the Clause or the Court’s precedent, he contends, but it also provides little guidance on how to apply it. Finally, the Constitution places limits on Congress’s power; the fact that states may support a particular statute – as twenty-nine do here – cannot render constitutional a statute that exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers.

Pre-Argument Articles

Argument Preview

Background

In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which gave the federal government (in 18 U.S.C. § 4248) authority to seek civil commitment of “sexually dangerous person[s]” already held in its custody. That authority in turns allows the government to seek to have individuals who are either completing federal prison sentences or incompetent to stand trial remain in federal custody indefinitely as a result of their “sexually dangerous” status.

To secure the continued detention of an individual completing his sentence, the government must demonstrate that by clear and convincing evidence that the individual “is a sexually dangerous person”; if the United States can make this showing, the individual is committed to the custody of the Attorney General, who must then “make all reasonable efforts to cause” the state in which the individual resides or was tried “to assume . . . responsibility” for his custody and care.

When four of the respondents in this case were completing terms in federal prison, the federal government initiated civil-commitment proceedings against them. (A fifth respondent was in federal custody because he had been found mentally incompetent to stand trial). The individuals moved to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds that Section 4248 exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, that the “clear and convincing” requirement did not meet due process standards, and that the Section violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. A federal district court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Section 4248 exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers. The United States filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which was denied.

Certiorari

The United States petitioned for certiorari in which it emphasized that even if there was not a circuit split on the proper interpretation of Section 4248, the Supreme Court has nonetheless frequently granted cert. when a court of appeals declares an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. The government attributed the lack of a circuit split to the fact that a large number of sex offenders in federal custody are held at a facility in North Carolina, which leads to the majority of civil-commitment proceedings – and challenges to them – taking place within the Fourth Circuit.

The Court granted the petition in June 2009; in so doing, it declined Comstock’s suggestion (raised in his brief in opposition) that it also address whether Section 4248 comports with due process.

Merits

In its brief on the merits, the United States begins by observing that it “bears the burden” of proving that a person is sexually dangerous before detaining him. A person found to be “sexually dangerous,” it continues, can challenge his detention at any time; further, his detention remains under federal control only if the state in which he lives or was tried refuses to assume responsibility for his custody.

The government then turns to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which in its view authorizes Section 4248 as an “appropriate” and “not prohibited” means by which to pursue a “legitimate” constitutional end. Pointing to the “decades of law” dealing with the civil commitment system, the government contends that civil commitment authority has long been considered “properly incident” to the exercise of federal powers, and that the legitimacy of the government’s custodial role in the detention of “sexually dangerous” persons is well-established. Moreover, although the system’s original framework was intended to address the detention of other individuals in whom the federal government had a “special interest” – such as members of the military – this framework serves, according to the government, the same ends as Section 4248. And because Section 4248 deals with the custody of individuals already held in federal custody, its application does not represent an intrusion on the rights of states.

Turning next to the lower court’s determination that Section 4248 is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s rulings in United States v. Morrison and United States v. Lopez, the government contends that, unlike the statutes addressed by those cases, Section 4248 includes a “jurisdictional element” which ensures that all affected cases implicate federal interests. Because it is limited to individuals already “in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons” or “committed to the custody of the Attorney General,” the statute applies only to cases in which a legitimate federal interest exists. Furthermore, because Section 4248 allows states to assume responsibility for federal prisoners domiciled and tried there, it “pays due respect” to federalism.

Finally, the government criticizes the lower court’s decision to dismiss the proceedings against one respondent without explaining why Section 4248 was unconstitutional as applied to individuals who, like him, had been found incompetent to stand trial. Although the lower court conceded that civil commitment of such individuals would lie within the federal government’s authority if pursued under another statute, the government complains, it did not articulate why the same would not be true of civil commitment pursued under Section 4248.

In his brief on the merits, respondent Graydon Comstock emphasizes that the Necessary and Proper Clause is merely a “caveat” allowing Congress to carry out powers already enumerated in the Constitution, rather than a “standalone basis for federal legislation.” The authority to enact criminal laws and to operate a prison system is a “necessary and proper means of carrying out specific enumerated powers” – rather than being itself an enumerated power – and a further exercise of power for the purpose of carrying out that authority cannot therefore be “necessary and proper.” Because no enumerated power directly supports Section 4248, the section cannot be said to be necessary and proper for the purposes of enacting such powers.

Responding to the government’s contentions that Section 4248 is “necessary and proper” because of the “connections,” “interests,” and “special relationships” between the federal government and the individuals affected by the provision, Comstock argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause requires a statute to be justifiable in relation to an enumerated power, not to the regulated individual. Indeed, he observes, the “special relationship” between a detainee and the federal government can be applied to many citizens: according to the government’s reasoning, employees, recipients of federal benefits, and numerous others can be seen as subject to the type of general police powers authorized by Section 4248. Likewise, he contends, the government’s asserted “interest” in preventing crime does not justify the custodial authority which Section 4248 sanctions.

Comstock also notes that the government declined to defend Section 4248 under the Commerce Clause, speculating that such a defense would be baseless because most sexually violent conduct represents a violation of state law. In Morrison, the Court rejected the notion that Congress can regulate noneconomic violence by invoking the Commerce Clause, and the lower court’s comparison between that case and his was an accurate one. Moreover, Morrison identifies the suppression of violent crime as a core state power; by transferring that power to the federal government, Section 4248 interferes with state sovereignty.

Comstock also contends that the history of civil commitment actually reflects a federal reluctance to interfere with the power of the states. Congress and the Executive Branch have repeatedly been reluctant to allow the federal government to play more than a limited role in civil commitment, in particular allowing the federal government to retain commitment custody only of insane individuals enlisted in the army and navy or living in the District of Columbia.

Links and Further Information

Media Coverage

From the Blogosphere

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