Waddington v. Sarausad
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Authorship: Ann Lee, a student at Harvard Law School.
Contents |
[edit] Briefs and Documents
Docket: 07-772
Issue: Whether, on federal habeas review, courts must accept state court determinations that jury instructions fully and correctly set out state law with regard to accomplice liability.
Merit briefs
- Brief for Petitioner Doug Waddington
- Brief for Respondent Cesar Sarausad
- Reply Brief for Petitioner Doug Waddington
Amicus briefs
Oral Argument: Transcript
Decision: REVERSED AND REMANDED in an Opinion by Justice Thomas
[edit] Pre-Argument Articles
[edit] Argument Preview
In Waddington v. Sarausad, No. 07-772, the Supreme Court will consider if and when, on habeas appeals, federal courts can review state court determinations on the adequacy of jury instructions.
[edit] Background
In 1994, respondent Cesar Sarausad, Jerome Reyes, Brian Ronquillo, and other friends affiliated with the 23rd Street Diablos gang drove to a Seattle high school to confront a rival gang. Sarausad drove in the lead car with Reyes and Ronquillo, who had obtained a gun from a friend. Approaching the school, Sarausad slowed down, and Ronquillo fired gunshots from the front passenger seat, killing one student and injuring another. Ronquillo was convicted of one count of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of second-degree assault. The State prosecuted Sarausad and Reyes for the same charges as accomplices.
The central contested issue in Sarausad’s trial was whether he had the requisite knowledge to be an accomplice to murder. Sarausad claimed he went to the school expecting only a fist fight and denied knowing that Ronquillo had a gun or intended to shoot anyone. At the time of trial, it was unclear under Washington law whether an accomplice had to have knowledge (1) that the principal merely intended to commit a crime or (2) that the principal intended to commit the particular crime in question. The prosecutor seemed to espouse the former view, articulating an “in for a dime, in for a dollar” theory that suggested Sarausad was culpable for murder or attempted murder regardless of whether he knew Ronquillo would commit those specific crimes.
The jury instructions, tracking the language of Washington’s accomplice liability statute, provided that “[a] person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she either: (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing the crime.” During deliberations, the jury sought clarification on the accomplice liability issue three times; the judge told it only to refer back to the instructions. Sarausad was convicted of second-degree murder, two attempted second-degree murders, and second-degree assault.
On direct appeal, Sarausad challenged the jury instructions as an inaccurate interpretation of Washington accomplice liability law. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, concluding that both the accomplice liability statute and the jury instructions used at trial were correctly based on the “in for a dime, in for a dollar” theory.
A few years later, the Washington Supreme Court repudiated the “in for a dime, in for a dollar” theory in two other cases, State v. Cronin and State v. Roberts. Instead, that court clarified, accomplice liability attached only when the alleged accomplice knew he was promoting or facilitating the same crime for which he was charged. In light of these decisions, Sarausad sought post-conviction relief by filing a personal restraint petition before the Washington Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that it had misinterpreted the accomplice liability statute on direct appeal, it nonetheless rejected Sarausad’s PRP, holding that the State was not relieved of its burden of proof at trial and that any confusion among the jury was not caused by incorrect instructions or improper prosecutorial argument. The court found that the jury instructions in Sarausad’s trial correctly “mirrored” the accomplice liability statute and that “the prosecutor made it crystal clear to the jury that the State wanted Sarausad found guilty … because he knowingly facilitated the drive-by shooting and for no other reason.” The Washington Supreme Court denied review, agreeing with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the jury had been appropriately instructed on accomplice liability law in compliance with the Roberts decision.
Sarausad sought federal habeas relief, which the district court granted relief on two grounds: first, that there was insufficient evidence to convict Sarausad, and, second, that the jury instructions, when combined with other factors, unconstitutionally relieved the State of its burden of proof.
On appeal, a Ninth Circuit majority reversed the district court’s decision as to the first ground, but affirmed as to the second. In the court’s view, the instructions used in Sarausad’s trial were ambiguous for three reasons: (1) they lacked an explicit statement that an accomplice must have knowledge of the actual crime the principal intends to commit; (2) in the Roberts case, the Washington Supreme Court had recently rejected a very similar instruction because it allowed a jury to incorrectly impose accomplice liability on the “in for a dime, in for a dollar” theory; and (3) on direct appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals had held that the instructions were consistent with the statute and that both were based on the now-discredited “in for a dime, in for a dollar” theory.
Having determined that the instructions were ambiguous, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury had unconstitutionally misapplied the instructions. First, the court explained, the evidence supporting the conclusion that Sarausad knew that Ronquillo intended to commit murder was “somewhat thin.” Second, the prosecutor “clearly and forcefully” articulated the “in for a dime, in for a dollar” theory of accomplice liability. Third, the jury’s notes to the judge during deliberations illustrated its substantial confusion about the State’s burden of proof. Fourth, even after the accomplice liability statute had been clarified in Cronin and Roberts, Washington courts misstated the record and ignored the prosecutor’s repeated dime-dollar arguments to deny Sarausad’s PRP.
Judge Bybee dissented on the jury instruction issue, contending that neither the statute nor the instructions were ambiguous, that it was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established Supreme Court law for Washington courts to conclude that the instructions were correct and fair, and that there was not a “reasonable likelihood” of misapplication by the jury. Because the Sarausad instructions mimicked the language of the statute – allowing conviction only if Sarausad were “an accomplice… in the commission of the crime” (as opposed to the Roberts instructions, which referred to “a crime”) – any ambiguity was eliminated. Judge Bybee also insisted that there was substantial evidence that the jury was properly instructed and nothing in Supreme Court jurisprudence would have alerted the state courts of any potential constitutional violation.
The State’s petition for re-hearing en banc was denied. Judge Callahan, writing on behalf of five judges dissenting from the denial, argued that the panel majority had failed to give proper deference to the Washington Supreme Court’s analysis of the state accomplice liability statute. By rejecting the jury instructions approved by the state courts, Judge Callahan asserted, the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted Washington law and issued a decision that directly conflicted with state precedent.
[edit] Petition for Certiorari
Doug Waddington, Superintendent of the Washington Corrections Center, filed a petition for certiorari, urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision for two reasons. First, he contended that the Ninth Circuit improperly disregarded the Washington courts’ determination that the jury instructions given at Sarausad’s trial, which closely tracked the language of the statute, properly set forth all of the elements of accomplice liability. Instead, he explained, the Ninth Circuit conducted its own analysis of Washington law and concluded that the instructions were “very similar” to those held invalid in Roberts, even though the Roberts court had “unambiguously approved of the pattern instructions, as given in Sarausad’s trial.”
Second, Waddington maintained, the Ninth Circuit failed to give proper deference to the state court adjudication of Sarausad’s federal claim. Emphasizing that federal courts owe a high level of deference to state court adjudications under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), Waddington claimed that the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to accept Washington courts’ determination of state law conflicted with decisions of other circuits. Waddington contested the alleged ambiguity of the jury instructions, arguing that they did not violate due process and that the state court decision that the jury was properly instructed was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
In his brief in opposition, Sarausad disputed Waddington’s claim that the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Washington courts on whether the accomplice liability instructions correctly stated Washington law. Rather, he contended, the Ninth Circuit “accepted that the instructions tracked the language of the statute and accepted the definitive interpretation of that statute provided by the Washington Supreme Court,” but recognized that the law was misapplied in Sarausad’s case, leading to jury confusion and improper conviction. The Ninth Circuit’s decision was not a failure to give proper deference, but legitimate judicial review based upon valid concerns about the Washington Court of Appeals’ mischaracterization of the record. Sarausad also disputed Waddington’s contention that the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicted with those of other circuits, distinguishing the examples cited by Waddington on factual and legal grounds.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 17, 2008.
[edit] Merit Briefs
Expanding on themes from his certiorari petition, Waddington begins his argument by reiterating the highly deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which bars habeas corpus relief if the state court adjudication on the merits resulted in a decision that was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Waddington emphasizes that the AEDPA’s use of the phrase “unreasonable application” means that the state decision must be more than merely incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable.
Second, Waddington contends that the Ninth Circuit failed to accept the state court determination that the accomplice liability instructions in Sarausad’s trial correctly reflected Washington law. Emphasizing that a federal habeas court may not second-guess state court determinations of state law, Waddington accuses the Ninth Circuit of disregarding the authoritative interpretation of the Washington courts that the jury instructions tracked statutory language and complied with the requirements set out in Roberts. In its erroneous independent examination of the instructions, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that the state courts should have required “an explicit statement that an accomplice must have knowledge of the actual crime the principal intends to commit.” However, Waddington asserts, not only does such a requirement lack any basis in a statute or the Constitution, but no Washington court has ever required such a specific statement either. Additionally, Waddington claims that such an “explicit statement” is actually inconsistent with the state’s knowledge requirement, which requires only that the jury find Sarausad “acted with knowledge that his … conduct would promote or facilitate ‘the crime’ for which he [was] eventually charged.”
Third, Waddington argues that the Washington courts reasonably concluded that the accomplice liability instruction did not establish a due process violation. Sarausad was required to show that “the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process” – a substantial burden that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply. Waddington cites a number of Supreme Court decisions, including Cupp v. Naughton, Henderson v. Kibbe, and Patterson v. New York, to illustrate that state courts could reasonably determine that jury instructions correctly setting forth state law did not relieve the State of its burden of proof. The jury instructions in Sarausad’s trial did not omit an element of the offense, create a presumption of fact, or shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Waddington claims that nothing in the Court’s holdings would put state courts on notice that such instructions would be so ambiguous as to violate due process.
Finally, Waddington argues that the other factors on which the Ninth Circuit relied to find a due process violation do not satisfy AEDPA’s highly deferential standard. The Ninth Circuit erroneously rejected the Court of Appeals’ reasonable determination that the prosecutor’s closing argument was proper, concluding instead that the state court misstated the record. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that the prosecutor relied unacceptably on the “in for a dime, in for a dollar” theory and that the Court of Appeals overlooked these improper arguments in insisting that the prosecutor had actually focused on Sarausad’s knowledge of Ronquillo’s intentions. This sort of re-analysis of the prosecutor’s remarks by the Ninth Circuit, Waddington contends, exceeds the scope of review under AEDPA. Even as a factual issue, a review of the trial record reveals that the prosecutor continually argued that Sarausad and his friends went to the high school clearly intending to shoot and kill.
Waddington also dismisses the Ninth’s Circuit’s reliance on the jury’s inquiries as evidence of ambiguity and a reasonable likelihood that the instructions were unconstitutionally applied. He notes that the trial judge properly responded to each inquiry by referring the jury to the instructions that correctly set forth state law. The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the jury was confused about the law is based on a mere conjecture, one that is unsupported by the record. Waddington argues that had the jury remained confused after its initial inquiries were answered, it would have continued to request clarification; because it did not, one must assume it understood the court’s responses. The jury’s failure to reach a verdict as to Sarausad’s co-defendant Reyes further indicates that it was not confused about accomplice liability law: if it truly were operating under an erroneous strict-liability theory, the jury would have had no difficulty convicting Reyes.
As for the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the evidence against Sarausad as so “thin” as to render the state court adjudication unreasonable, Waddington asserts that “this reasoning gives no deference to the state court’s view of the evidence, and it makes little sense in light of the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the state court could reasonably conclude the evidence was sufficient to prove Sarausad guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
[edit] Oral Argument Recap
[edit] Opinion Analysis
By a 6-3 vote, the Court in Waddington v. Sarausad (07-772) moved to further limit the authority of federal courts to second-guess the decisions of state courts on instructions given to juries on an accomplice’s role in a crime. Justice Thomas wrote for the majority. Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens.
[edit] Links and further information
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