Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association
From ScotusWiki
Authorship: Michelle Swiren
Contents |
[edit] Briefs and Documents
Docket: 07-869
Issue: Whether, under the First Amendment, a state legislature may bar political subdivisions from making payroll deductions for political activities.
- Opinion below (9th Circuit)
- Petition for certiorari
- Brief in opposition
- Petitioner’s reply
- Amicus brief of the Utah Taxpayers’ Association (in support of the petitioner)
- Brief for Petitioner Ben Ysursa, In His Official Capacity as Idaho Secretary of State; and Lawrence G. Wasden, In His Official Capacity as Idaho Attorney General
- Brief for Respondent Pocatello Education Association, the Idaho Education Association; the International Association of Fire Fighters Local 743, Professional Fire Fighters of Idaho, Inc., Service Employees International Union Local 687, Idaho State AFL-CIO, and Mark L. Heideman In His Official Capacity as Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney
- Reply Brief for Petitioner Ben Ysursa, In His Official Capacity as Idaho Secretary of State; and Lawrence G. Wasden, In His Official Capacity as Idaho Attorney General
Amicus briefs
- Brief for the Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for Americans for Limited Government in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for the States of Utah, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Texas in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Neither Party
Oral Argument: Transcript
Decision: REVERSED in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts
[edit] Pre-Argument Articles
[edit] Argument Preview
[edit] Background
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Idaho Voluntary Contributions Act, which – as enacted in 2003 – restricted the extent to which labor organizations could participate in political activities . Labor organizations representing employees of school districts, cities, and counties in Idaho sued Idaho state officials in federal district court, claiming that the Act violated their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. State officials conceded that all of the challenged provisions of the Act were unconstitutional except for one: § 44-2004(2), which provides that “[d]eductions for political activities” – which the Code defines as “electoral activities, independent expenditures, or expenditures made to any candidate, political party, political action committee or political issues committee or in support of or against any ballot measure” – “shall not be deducted from wages, earnings or compensation of an employee.” The district court held that the ban on payroll deductions was constitutional as applied to the state government itself, but unconstitutional as applied to private and local government employers. The State appealed the constitutionality of the ban as applied to local government employers.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that § 44-2004(2) “violates the First Amendment because it is a content-based law for which the State officials assert no compelling justification.” First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, § 44-2004(2) burdens political speech by making it difficult for the labor organizations to collect funds for participation in political activities. The court of appeals rejected the state’s argument that a second exception to the strict scrutiny rule – for nonpublic fora – applied because § 44-2004(2) is viewpoint neutral (because it prohibits all political speech) and thus reasonably serves the State’s interest in having its payroll system neither assist nor appear to assist with political matters. ,Although Idaho contended that it had plenary power under the State’s constitution to regulate certain aspects of local government and even to alter or abolish local governments altogether, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that the Idaho Code actually grants substantial control to local governments and that local governments are distinct entities from the State. As such, the court concluded, the State had failed to establish that it was the “proprietor of the local government workplaces or their payroll deduction programs,” such that the programs would constitute “nonpublic fora belonging to the State.” Moreover, the court continued, even if the forum were analyzed according to “an alternative theory . . . which evaluates the forum in light of the degree of control exercised by the government entity,” rather than by the degree of ownership, the State’s argument would still fail, as it had failed to show any current or previous control over the payroll deduction systems of local governments.
Applying strict scrutiny review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to local government employers.
[edit] Petition for Certiorari
The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in which it offered two reasons the Court should grant the petition. First, the State argues, the Supreme Court and every federal court of appeals or highest state court to consider the issue have held that there is no First Amendment right of access to the payroll systems of governmental entities for purposes of employee-authorized deductions. The general rationale for these decisions is that the federal, state, and local governments have no affirmative obligation to provide a platform for speech by facilitating employee contributions through their payroll systems. They argue the Ninth Circuit’s holding – which is based on the idea that the State does not “pervasively manage” local payroll systems – would replace “a bright-line, long-established constitutional standard” that a State may manage its political subdivisions as it manages itself with respect to the First Amendment, without regard to the pervasiveness of its involvement in the operation of those systems. Second, the State argues that the Ninth Circuit’s “managerial interest” test would require day-to-day control of local government payroll systems and put at risk legislative regulation of permissible employee-authorized deductions when First Amendment rights are implicated.
The State cites several Supreme Court decisions to support its argument that respondents have no First Amendment right to access the payroll systems that would require strict scrutiny analysis. Instead, it emphasizes, in City of Charlotte v. Firefighters Local 660 (1976), the Court applied the rational basis standard in rejecting an equal protection challenge to a city’s refusal to withhold dues from paychecks because there is no fundamental First Amendment right to payroll deductions that would have triggered strict scrutiny analysis. Similarly, the State asserts, the absence of a fundamental right to payroll deductions was also behind the Court’s decision to apply rational basis analysis in a suit over access to the internal mail system of a school district in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association (1983). Moreover, the State emphasizes, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment “does not impose any duty on a public employer to affirmatively assist…a union” and that “avoiding the appearance of political favoritism is a valid justification for limiting speech in a nonpublic forum” under the rational basis standard.
The State asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s decision violates black-letter law that allows government to exclude speakers from government property based on the subject matter of their speech as long as the decisions to exclude are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum. It relies on Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza (6th Cir. 1998), in which the Sixth Circuit upheld an Ohio statute “substantially indistinguishable” from § 44-2004(2) on the ground that the state may impose requirements on organizations seeking privileged access to payroll deductions. They further argue that the government is not required to assist the exercise of political speech no matter how much the lack of assistance undercuts the efforts of the union.
The State next attacks what it labels the Ninth Circuit’s “managerial interest” test. It argues that the Ninth Circuit replaced firm First Amendment standards with this test, which ignores Idaho’s implicit control over every facet of local government—i.e., that the State has assigned those subdivisions their governmental responsibilities, which must be carried out according to state statutes. The State argues that the Ninth Circuit’s test would require the State to assume day-to-day management of local payroll systems if it wants to impose any limitation on employee-authorized payroll deductions for political purposes.
Opposing certiorari, respondents offer three main arguments. First, they argue that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is consistent with (and its “managerial interest” test justified by) the Supreme Court’s decisions, because every case in which the Court has applied a deferential standard of review to the governmental restriction of speech in a nonpublic forum has been one in which the government owned and managed the forum. Relying on International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992), respondents further assert that because the State is acting as a regulator of speech, its exclusions based on subject matter are subject to strict scrutiny analysis instead of the deferential standard that applies when the government acts as a manager of property.
Second, they argue that no circuit split exists because the Ninth Circuit’s decision is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s 2008 opinion in Utah Education Ass’n v. Shurtleff, which is the only other case to have decided this question. Respondents seek to refute the State’s argument that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pizza creates a circuit split, explaining that the Ohio statute failed to differentiate between state and local government payroll programs. Because the Sixth Circuit’s analysis is based on a scenario in which the statute applies only to the State itself, respondents reason, Pizza thus considers a different issue than the one in this case.
Finally, the respondents deny that the Ninth Circuit decision will have the repercussions alleged by the State. In their view, the decision below will neither deprive States of their right to control local government entities nor cause state governments to “seize control” over their political subdivisions to put limits on speech.
In its reply brief, the State reiterates that the Ninth Circuit’s “managerial interest” test is a misapplication of First Amendment law, arguing that no First Amendment jurisprudence supports the respondent’s proprietor-regulator distinction. It also asserts that the Ohio statute at issue in Pizza was “materially indistinguishable from § 44-2004(2), and that the Sixth Circuit’s failure to distinguish between state and local government programs is irrelevant because the plaintiff in Pizza based its claim on the legislature’s intrusion “on the ability of any public employer, including local government, to enter into check-off arrangement related to political activities.” Finally, the State reiterates that the Ninth Circuit decision has negative consequences, such as forcing states to remove authority of local governments to impose payroll deduction limitations.
[edit] Merits Briefing
In the State’s brief on the merits, it argues that the Ninth Circuit has strayed from established First Amendment jurisprudence by creating a proprietary-regulatory distinction instead of applying established First Amendment forum principles. If those principles were properly applied, the State continues, the payroll systems at issue would be designated as nonpublic fora, access to which “may be denied or limited on grounds that are reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose and otherwise viewpoint neutral.” Relying on Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (1985), the State asserts that it is reasonable for public entities to avoid the appearance of political involvement, and the outright ban removes any chance of viewpoint bias.
The State also makes a federalism argument, asserting that state legislatures traditionally have broad discretion in how they allocate responsibilities to political subdivisions. Because school districts, counties, and other political subdivisions are required to discharge their duties according to legislative directives from the State, the Idaho Constitution gives the State plenary power over political subdivisions and, thus, the legislative discretion to address issues of statewide concern. Moreover, the State argues, multiple provisions of the Idaho Code impose requirements on these subdivisions, including requirements relating to public employee relations. The State maintains that the Ninth Circuit’s proprietary-regulatory distinction fails to recognize the State’s authority to regulate access to forums managed by political subdivisions and forces States to assume pervasive day-to-day control “over all aspects of the operation of a political subdivision’s payroll system if it desires to regulate one discrete practice.”
[edit] Oral Argument Recap
[edit] Opinion Analysis
Lyle Denniston originally wrote the following for SCOTUSblog
The Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that the Constitution allows a state government to ban payroll deductions for labor union political activities, when the ban applies to the paychecks of local government workers. The decision in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association (07-869) was written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., with the result supported by a 6-3 vote. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a partial dissent, but it focused on the main point. Justices David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens each wrote a dissenting opinion.
[edit] Links and further information
[[Category:]]
